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U. S. AR.i.~S CONTROL AND DISARJ."'1.AMENT AGENCY 
STATUS REPORT 
ON THE DRAFT TREATY 
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION 
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
SUMMARY 
March 23, 1968 
Consideration of a draft Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) was completed in the Eighteen Nations 
Disarmament Committe e. (ENDC) in Geneva on March 
14. It will now be considered in the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) around April 17, 
along with a proposed resolution of the Security 
Council dealing with security assurances. It is 
our hope that after 3 or 4 weeks debate the GA 
will endorse the present text substantially as is 
and recommend that it be opened for prompt signa-
ture. We should be able to persuade most of the 
nations with little or no nuclear potential to 
support the NPT. However, several of the poten-
tial nuclear weapon states, such as India, Italy, 
Brazil, and the Federal Republic of Germany, still 
have reservations concerning certain aspects of 
the present draft, and there are still uncertain-
ties as to how the GA debate may turn out. In view 
of these uncertainties, U.S. action with respect to 
signing the Treaty, submitting it to the Senate, 
and ratifying it, needs to be related to future 
developments which cannot be clearly predicted at 
this time. 
Once the NPT is concluded and opened for signa-
ture there will be strong pressures applied on the 
nuclear powers to start making progress on nuclear 
disarmament measures, such as a comprehensive ban on 
nuclear weap on testing and a halt in the production 
of fissionable ma terial for weapons purposes. The 
language of the NPT will also raise an expectation 
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that the US and the USSR will engage in an early 
dialogue leading to agreement to limit the stra~ 
tegic arms race. Finally, a strong iriterest has 
already developed in applying arms control provi-
sions to the ocean floor. 
I. Status and Ne x t Ste~s 
The ENDC in Geneva completed deliberations on the text 
of a joint US-USSR sponsored draft NPT on March 14, 1968 
(Annex A). This draft treaty along with comments and views 
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of ENDC and other governments regarding the Treaty have been 
incorporated in an ENDC report to the UNGA pursuant to a 
request of the latter made during its 22nd session last fall. 
The report also has annexed to it a proposed 8ecurity Council 
resolution dealing with the question of providing assurances to 
non-nuclear weapon states which become parties to the NPT 
(see next section below). · 
The 22nd UNGA is expected to resume sometime around 
April 17 to 24 to consider the report of the ENDC. Our 
objective is to obtain wide support for the draft NPT and 
obtain a resolution after about 3 weeks of .debate which 
endorses the Treaty and asks that it be opened for signature. 
Action on security assurances, after initial consideration . 
along with the draft NPT in the Political Cormnittee, could 
also take place in the Security Council at about the same 
time, perhaps on the basis of a recommendation by the General 
Assembly. 
Ambassador Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador Malik have 
been in consultation with one another and with other dele-
gations regarding the timing of the resumed session and 
tactics to be pursued. Thought is being given to where 
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and at what level signing of the NPT might take place ; the 
Soviets have indicated a preference for Geneva . We are 
also holding open the possibility for Foreign Ministers 
attending the concluding stages of the UN debate , if this 
should be deemed desirable . 
Between now and the time the GA reconvenes we will work 
through diplomatic channels to garner maximum support for 
the present text . Particular attention will be given to 
certain nations such as India , Italy , Federal Republic of 
Germany, Brazil, Israel , South Africa , etc ., which still 
express reservations about certain aspects of the present 
text, or have thus far been noncommittal regarding their 
support. (See Section III below elaborating various country 
attitudes.) 
3 
Some critics of the present text , who nevertheless 
basically favor barring the further spread of nuclear weapons, 
can be expected to propose amendments in order to bring 
about - - as they see it - - a more " equitable" balance of 
obligations under the Treaty as between the nuclear and non-
nuclear powers. Rather than directly attacking the present 
draft other opponents may attempt to remand the NPT back to 
the ENDC for further consideration , or withhold final action 
until after conclusion of the Conference 0£ the ·Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States schedu]ed for late August 1968 . (At this 
Conference the non-nuclear-weopon States will harmonize their 
views with respect to the NPT. ) 
One probl m will be to control the Soviet inclination to 
"railroad" the NPT through the GA session , which we and the 
UK believe would be counter-productive . While permitting the 
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UN to "talk itself out" we would nevertheless like to con-
vey the impression that the text submitted to the UNGA is 
the text which wo 1 1ld be onened ror s·g at -.. .. j_ i n ure. 
If we achieve our aims in the UNGA we can proceed 
promptly to sign the NPT along with other willing countries. 
However, it may nonetheless still not prove desirable for 
the U.S. to deposit its instrument of ratification this 
summer ev n though Senate action msy have been completed. 
The U.S.S.R. may not ratify until the FRG does, which in 
turn may only follow an agreement on safeguards between the 
IAEA and EURATOM.. Under these circumstances we may also 
vish to defer completion of ratification. 
If we fail in our objectives at the UNGA and the Treaty 
is remanded to the ENDC, or final action is postponed until 
after the Conference of Non-Nuclear Nations in August, it 
might be inadvisable to submit it to the Senate this summer, 
even though we still might wish to consider signature by 
those nations \·Jilling to proceed notwithstanding the UNGA 
action. In any event questions concerning the timing of 
U.S. signature, submission to the Senate, and ratification 
can only be answered in the light of GA action yet to come . 
II. Security Assurances 
On March 7, the United States, the Soviet Union and the 
UK sub1nitted to the ENDC a draft Security Council resolution 
welcoming the intention of certain nuclear-weapon states 
to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance 
with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon party that is 
a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression 
in which nuclear ·weapons are used. (Annex B.) 
During consideration of the resolution by the Security 
Council we plan to make a unilateral declaration of how we 
intend to act under the resolulion. The Soviet Union and 
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the UK will also make declarations identical in all substan-
tive provisions . We would declare that aggression with nuclear 
weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-
nuclear state would create a qualitatively new situation in 
which the nuclear states \vhich are permanent members of the 
UN Security Council would have to act immediately through the 
Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter 
the aggression or to remove the threat in accordance with the 
UN Charler . 
We ·would also affirm our intention, as a permanent mem-
ber of the UN Security Council , to seek immediate Security 
Council action to provide assistance , in accordance with the 
Charter, to any non-nuclear state , party to the NPT, that is 
a victim of an act of agsression or an object of a threat of 
aggression in which nuclear weapons are used . ( See Annex C 
for full text of the declaration .) 
Both the Security Council resolution and the US declara-
tion are applicable only to non-nuclear countries that adhere 
to the 1\TPT. They create no new obligations for the United 
States; any measures which might result would be strictly in 
accordance with existing provisions and procedures of the 
United 1otions Charter. The assurance actipn contains no 
promise by nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear parties to the NPT, which omissions will undoubt-
edly cause criticism by some non-nuclear countries . The 
proposed assurances action is nevertheless of great political 
significance because it will represent concerted policy of 
the United States and the Soviet Union in a security field of 
great importance for non-nuc]car countries and will thus be 
regarded by a great many non··nuclear countries as<a promising 
and vc. luablc step \vhich ·will make ratification of the NPT 
easier for them. 
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I II . Views of Governments on the NPT 
The only countries which appear determined not to sign 
the NPT are Communist China , France, Albania and Cuba. 
North Korea and North Vietnam probably will not sign for 
special political reasons. ( See Annex D for detailed run-
down of country attitudes). 
Despite certain problems for the FRG and to a lesser 
extent Italy, we expect adherence by all NATO members ex-
c ept France. Australia , New Zealand , Japan ancl Nationalist 
China are expected to adhere . Pakistan may not adhere un-
less assured that India i s prepared to do so . 
Among the non-aligned c ountries , Sweden , which is a 
leading spokesman on disarmament affairs and a member of 
the ENDC, is a strong supporter of the Treaty . 
The major holdout may b e India , which has followed a 
negative and cautious policy . On balance India may decide 
to adhere if it considers this would serve its overall 
interests. But at this. time it does not appear that India 
will be among the early signers. Even if India finally 
decides not to sign the Treaty , it is unlikely that this 
will exert a major influence on the decisions of other 
non-nuclear countries except Pakistan , since i t i s widely 
recognized that India has a special problem with Conm1unist 
China. 
All the Latin American countries except Cuba have 
either signed or indicated intention to sign the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco (:reating a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone . 




action ori the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone. We have 
indications that even Brazil , which has adamantly opposed 
the present NPT text, may be reconsidering the consequences 
of non-adherence . 
We are co~fident that Nigeria and Ethopia, which have 
expressed substantial support for the NPT draft in t he ENDC , 
represent the prevailing African view . African views will 
be influenced by South Africa ' s attitude toward the Treat~ 
~-Jhich we believe will be positive . 
The UAR has indicated a strong inclination to sign if 
Israel does. We believe there is a good chance that Israel 
will adhere and that the Ara b countries wi l l follow . 
Other Asian countries ( not covered above ) are not 
expected to object to the Treaty and probably would follow 
Japan ' s lead in signing promptly . 
IV . After the NPT, }vHAT? 
In xc~ange for renouncing the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by the non-nuclear signatories , the nuclear signa-
tories ( US, USSR, and UK) are obligated to pursue negotia-
tions on eff2ctive measures toward nuclear d isarmament . 
Pressure will develop for action in four pr i ncipa l areas : 
Lecl by Sweden , most non-nuclear nations with 
possible support from the Soviets will press s trong l y for 
a ban on nuclear testing in all environments . They wil l 
conteud that the risks of non-detection h ave reached t he 
de minimis point , and should be blanketed by an act of po li-
tfcai"·-{a.{th . We will continue t o mainta in our p os ition 
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..:! complete ban is undesirable unless there is provi-
... 1 for proper verification of compliance, and that this 
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dn only be done through on-site inspections when suspicious 
s eismic events occur. 
2. Cut-off of Fissionable Material For Weapons 
Purposes 
Most nations will support the U.S. in its long-
stan~ing proposal on this subject. However, since safeguards 
inspection would be required in the U.S.S.RQ, there is serious 
doubt whether the Soviets would agree to such a measure. 
There will be strong pressure on the U.S. and 
the U.SoS.R. to halt or limit their strategic arms race in 
both offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviets have 
indicated interest in principle in talking about the problem, 
but have not yet agreed to a date. They have suggested that 
we make a concrete proposal, while complaining that Viet Nam 
makes talks politically difficulte 
4. Arms Control on the Seabed 
There has also been a strong interest develop-
ing in applying arms control provisions to the ocean floor. 
This \vas discussed in broad tenns at the last General Assembly 
and raised again during the past week by an Ad Hoc Committee 
- established by the Assembly to consider the future uses of 
the ocean flooro In this Committee the U SoS.R. proposed 
"prohibiting the use of the seabeds c-1nd ocean floor for military 
activities bey01td the boundaries of nationa l jurisdiction. 
Mankind cannot permit a situation whereby nuclear weapons spread 
into tJ1is cnvironrnent, which in the future is undoubtedly going 
to become one of the most important sources of well being for 
the people of our planel ..• " 
We need to develop a viable, forthcoming position 
on these questions if we are to protect our ho.sic security in-
terests in the seabed and if we arc to ma~1tain the credibility 
0£ our jntcntion to pursue practical Qrrns control measures in 
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line with the wording of the NPT. It may well be that a 
proposal which avoids complete demilitarization of the 
ocean seabed, but which would ban the deployment of weapons 
of mass destruction in this environment would find wide-
spread support. It would be the topic most mutually accept-
able to the U 0 S.S.R~ and ourselves for negotiation during 
the next session of the ENDC. 
Attachments: 
Annex A - Draft NPT of March 11, 1968 -
Annex B Draft SC Resolution on Security Assurances 
Annex C - Proposed US Statement on SC Resolution 
Annex D - Views of Governments on the NPT 
ACDA/IR - March 23, 1968 
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